Linguistic Definition
The Arabic term kasb means to seek, pursue and attain. (Mu‘jam al-Maqāyīs, 5:179)
Technical Definition
According to Ash‘ari tradition, acquisition is the simultaneity between the power of a creature that has the attribute of will and the act of the Creator. The subject of acquisition is amongst the most subtle and obscure in the science of Kalām. Disagreements abound amongst different factions of the mutakallimūn. After the agreement of all mutakallimūn and philosophers that a physical object does not create physical objects, they disagreed over whether a human being creates his own acts, and whether he truly has agency in anything else, or is the Necessary Existent the creator of all things. Thus the primary issue is whether it is possible for anyone apart from Allāh (Exalted is He) to have power capable of bringing into existence and taking out of existence, and whether it is possible for the Creator to bring another creator into existence.
In the opinion of the Sunni tradition, the human being, and likewise all animals and creatures, do not create any of its volitional acts, but rather acquire them, while all of them occur by the direct creation of Allāh without the intermediary of anything from His creation. The reality of a human being’s acts is that when he directs his mind towards an action, Allāh creates it for him by virtue of his will. Thus, acquisition is only the human being’s intent being directed towards an action and his power connecting to it, not agency that brings into existence. When this direction and connection is achieved, creation occurs, not from the temporal power but from the divine beginningless power. It is rationally possible for there to be a disconnect between the connection of the temporal power and the creation of the act, since a human being may intend something and his power connects to it, but despite this the act does not occur, due to the divine beginningless power not connecting to the occurrence of this action. The Sunni tradition refers to the connection of the human being’s power as acquisition and the connection of Allāh’s (Exalted is He) power as creation.
The reason for advocating the doctrine of acquisition is that since it is established by evidence that the divine power is all-inclusive and Allāh (Exalted is He) is alone in creating and bringing into existence, as it would otherwise entail mutual repulsion in the act of bringing an act into existence and this mutual repulsion would entail stripping away power from the divine power (see the entry on the argument of mutual repulsion); and it is similarly established that it is impossible for two active agents to cause one effect from the same direction; and we likewise know a priori that a human being has volitional acts in that these acts occur according to his intent whenever he puts his mind to it; and we know a priori that there is a distinction between his volitional acts and his involuntary acts; then we know with certainty that the human being does not create any of his own acts, but their Creator is Allāh alone, and a human being has only intent and inclination towards his volitional acts, and that the relationship between the power of the slave directed at the action and the action itself is only a relational attribution. This is acquisition according to the Sunni Ash‘arī school. The human being’s act being acquisition and the Creator’s act being creation is the concept that must be affirmed. In order to affirm acquisition it is not necessary to know its reality, just as it is not necessary in order to affirm creation to know its reality. Inability to explain it, either due to the paucity of expression or its obscurity in itself, does not entail its non-existence in reality. Thus, we may believe in acquisition based on some form of evidence, even if we do not comprehend its reality and all its details.
The Ash‘ari school argues for acquisition and human power not having any agency in his actions from a number of evidences. One is that if a human being really created his acts, it would entail that he is aware of his acts in detail, because bringing something into existence can only happen after having knowledge of its details, and it is impossible to direct one’s mind to something while being ignorant of it, since various possibilities occur in an act, as it could be in the form that it is or it could be in another form, and specifying it to one form to the exclusion of another can only be by knowing its details. Many acts occur in man and all animals without their knowledge of the details of that act. Walking is an example, as one walking traverses great distances, mobilising his muscles and tendons, and his steps are interspersed by pauses and movements, without him realising or being aware of all details of the acts. The most he knows about his act is his knowledge of its purpose and objective, and not the details of the act which occurs in his being. It is proven by this that wilful creatures do not create their own acts.
Another evidence is scripture. For example, the statement of Allāh (Exalted is He): “Allah is Creator of all things, and He is Guardian over all things.” (39:62) and His (Exalted is He) statement “Allah has created you and what you do.” (37:96)
The determinists and Mu‘tazilī tradition both disagreed with the Sunni tradition on this subject.
The determinists on the one hand did not differentiate between involuntary and volitional acts, and considered both to be created by Allāh and they negated intent from creatures for any of their acts.
The Mu‘tazili tradition on the other hand opined that the act of a created animal occurs by its power alone.
The philosophers opine that the act occurs by the power of the human being by compulsion. This view has been ascribed to Imām al-Juwaynī, whereas this attribution to him is incorrect as stated by a number of scholars. It has been ascribed to Ustādh al-Isfarāyīnī that the act occurs by a combination of the beginningless power and the temporal power. It has been related from al-Bāqillānī that the act occurs by Allāh’s power in terms of agency, while the effect of the temporal power is in the description of the act, in that it is obedience or disobedience. This is the view of the Māturīdi tradition on this question.
It is noticed that the Ash‘ari, Māturīdi, Mu‘tazili traditions as well as the philosophers, to the exclusion of the determinists, all agree that man and all animals, just as they have involuntary acts, have volitional acts which emerge from them by their intent without coercion or compulsion. The disagreement between them is only over whether man and creatures that have the attribute of will really create their acts or not. The Sunni tradition, comprising of both the Ash‘ari and Māturīdi schools, negate this, while the Mu‘tazili tradition and philosophers, affirm it, according to the explanation just given. (Abkār al-Afkār, 2:235; Sharḥ al-Mawāqif, 8:145; Maṭāli‘ al-Anẓār, p. 189)
